主 题：When do citizens want representation in exchange for taxation?An experimental study of property tax in urban China
主讲人：Xiaobo Lv, Associate Professor, The University of Texas at Austin
Professor Lü is an Assistant Professor from Department of Government. the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on the politics of social spending and taxation, and their political consequences. Professor Lü's publications have appeared in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, among other academic journals. He received his Ph.D. degree in Political Science from Yale University in 2011.
Tax compliance remains an obstacle to the building of state capacity in many developing countries. Conventional wisdom suggests a link between taxation and political representation, yet recent field experiments have often failed to find consistent evidence to support this link. We argue that citizens believe that the effectiveness of their input hinges on the presence of top-down sanctioning institutions. This conditional effect is particularly salient among those institutional outsiders with relatively fewer political rights and resources, thus they need the assurances from top-down institutions for bureaucratic sanctioning. We conducted a conjoint experiment of property tax in urban China to study willingness for tax compliance, and we found supporting evidence to our arguments. Our results remain robust after we explore alternative mechanisms on the conditional effects of citizen input for willingness for tax compliance, such as trust in government and perception of political efficacy.