主 题：Cooperation through Indirect Reciprocity: Impact of Higher-Order History
主办单位：中国行为经济与行为金融研究中心 经济学院 科研处
杨春雷教授是世界一流实验与行为经济学家，德国多特蒙德大学经济学博士，教育部长江学者特聘教授，从2016年起担任南京审计大学教授。主要研究微观经济学、博弈论、实验与行为经济学，在Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, European Economic Review等国际权威学术期刊发表论文20余篇。
Indirect reciprocity based on certain reputation systems is an important way to promote cooperation when repeated interaction becomes rare under globalization. Theoretically, coherent notions of reputation scores require knowledge of higher-order histories. Yet, how people use the acquired higher-order information to aid cooperation decisions is an open empirical question. We study a random-matching Prisoners’ Dilemma experiment with optional history information up to the second order, i.e. including the partner’s own previous partners’ action history. With the help of our newly defined continuous extension of some well-known reputation scores, we are the first to find that some simplified versions of standing and judging significantly affect the cooperation decision. More than half of subjects prove to be responsive to the higher-order scores, which also comes along with a certain payoff advantage. The positive reputation effect is much stronger when people have first played the baseline PD games without history information, where vanishing cooperation is inevitable. Under such a condition, subjects are also inclined to be more cooperative when both parties display high reputation scores.