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哈尔滨工业大学 吴航副教授 :An individual decision-making approach to bidding in pay-your-bid auctions

([西财资讯] 发布于 :2018-05-09 )

光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第4925期

 

题:An individual decision-making approach to bidding in pay-your-bid auctions

主讲人哈尔滨工业大学  吴航副教授

主持人经济学院  雷震教授

间:2018511日(星期五)10:30-11:30

点:利记娱乐网柳林校区格致楼 918

主办单位经济学院  科研处

 

主讲人概况:

Pro. Wu Hang is an associate professor in School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology. Graduated from University of Adelaide in 2014, he got PhD in Economics. His research interest includes Microeconomics, Game theory and Behavioral and Experimental Economics. In 2015, he published "Learning from inferred foregone payoffs", with Ralph Bayer,in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 51: 445-458; In 2016,Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics”, with Colin Camerer and etal. in Science, 351: 1433-1436.

主讲内容:

We propose a novel approach to the modelling of behavior in pay-your-bidauctions that builds on the presumption that bidders engage erned with  losing the auction if they happen to have the highest signal. Our models,NoR (for No-Regret) and nIBE (for naïve Impulse Balance Equilibrium) are  individual decision-making models that assume risk neutrality, no profit   maximization and no bidding above ones’ value. Their parameter-free  variants may entail nonlinear overbidding or Symmetric Nash Equilibrium  bidding and we discuss conditions for the revenue equivalence of standardpay-your-bid auctions to hold. We fit them to the data of first-price and all-pay auction experiments and find that they do at least as well as the     Bayes-Nash equilibrium benchmark model in organizing the observed behavior in first-price auctions and better in all-pay auctions. Assuming  probability misperception or impulse weighting (when relevant) improves    their goodness-of-fit.

 


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