主 题：An individual decision-making approach to bidding in pay-your-bid auctions
地 点：利记娱乐网柳林校区格致楼 918
Pro. Wu Hang is an associate professor in School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology. Graduated from University of Adelaide in 2014, he got PhD in Economics. His research interest includes Microeconomics, Game theory and Behavioral and Experimental Economics. In 2015, he published "Learning from inferred foregone payoffs", with Ralph Bayer,in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 51: 445-458; In 2016,“Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics”, with Colin Camerer and etal. in Science, 351: 1433-1436.
We propose a novel approach to the modelling of behavior in pay-your-bidauctions that builds on the presumption that bidders engage erned with losing the auction if they happen to have the highest signal. Our models,NoR (for No-Regret) and nIBE (for naïve Impulse Balance Equilibrium) are individual decision-making models that assume risk neutrality, no profit maximization and no bidding above ones’ value. Their parameter-free variants may entail nonlinear overbidding or Symmetric Nash Equilibrium bidding and we discuss conditions for the revenue equivalence of standardpay-your-bid auctions to hold. We fit them to the data of first-price and all-pay auction experiments and find that they do at least as well as the Bayes-Nash equilibrium benchmark model in organizing the observed behavior in first-price auctions and better in all-pay auctions. Assuming probability misperception or impulse weighting (when relevant) improves their goodness-of-fit.