主题：Do short-sellers mitigate or exacerbate analysts’ disincentives to disclose bad news?
赵武阳，现任McCombs School of Business，University of Texas at Austin助理教授。2017年获得多伦多大学Rotman School of Management会计学博士。复旦大学工商管理学士以及管理学博士。主要研究方向包括Short Selling, Financial Analysts, Valuation。曾获得CMU Mini Conference “Emerging Scholar” Finalist，Best Paper Award for GMU Conference on Investor Protection, Corporate Governance, and Fraud Prevention等学术奖项。曾在FARS，CAR Conference, PCAOB/JAR Conference, AAA annual meeting等学术会议, 以及在LBS、Columbia、NTU、NUS、BC、复旦等大学宣讲论文。
“Third Party Consequences of Short-selling Threats: The Case of Auditor Behavior” with Ole-Kristian Hope and Danqi Hu. 2017. Journal of Accounting and Economics 63(2-3): 479-498.
“Blockholder Exit Threats in the Presence of Private Benefits of Control” with Ole-Kristian Hope and Han Wu. 2017. Review of Accounting Studies 22: 873-902.
“Market Reactions to the Closest Peer Firm’s Analyst Revisions” with Ole-Kristian Hope. Accounting and Business Research, forthcoming.
This study examines whether the presence of short-sellers mitigates or exacerbates analysts’ disincentives to disclose negative information. We find that when short-selling potential (measured by lendable shares) is higher, analysts are less likely to self-select to initiate coverage on firms for which they have relatively favorable news and to drop firms for which they have relatively unfavorable news. This negative relation between short-selling potential and analysts’ self-selection is stronger among firms where analysts’ disclosure of negative information spurs more short sales. Further instrumental variable test and analysis of the introduction of option listing provide evidence that this relation is causal. Additional tests show that higher short-selling potential reduces the return predictability of abnormal analyst coverage. Overall, our results support Hayes’s (1998) theoretical prediction that the presence of short-sellers mitigates analysts’ disincentives to disclose negative information.